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1Introduction
This paper asks whether equity market returns incorporate a risk premium for low interest
rates, opposing the usual prediction that high interest rates constitute a risk factor. Low
interest rates could constitute a risk factor if they lead to excess leverage, thus increasing
crash risk. To limit the risk of endogeneity bias from equity prices to lending rates, common
volatility in exchange rate markets is used as an indicator of the component of equity risk
deriving from liquidity risk. Assuming that investors in equity and currency markets have
access to the same global credit markets, the funding conditions faced by both investors
are common across asset classes as well as assets. An increase in the shared component of
volatility across assets could indicate the increased importance of liquidity conditions over
fundamentals, signalling increased crash risk. In summary, this paper seeks to show that
excessively low interest rates could increase leverage and crash risk, which in turn could
increase excess equity returns, as investors demand compensation for this risk.
While there is a literature on incorporating liquidity risk in asset pricing models, to
the best of the author’s knowledge this will be the ﬁrst paper to empirically test whether
excessively loose global funding liquidity, rather than tight funding liquidity or low market
liquidity, is a priced risk factor. This is akin to asking if investors know when interest rates
are at a level which encourages excess leverage. If excess funding liquidity is a risk factor,
then changes in common volatility may provide a means by which monetary policy or other
ﬁnancial oversight authorities can infer when low interest rates are causing or contributing
to an asset price bubble.
The paper begins by establishing an empirical relationship between increased sensitivity
of exchange rates to global shocks (increased common volatility) and changes in funding
liquidity. This allows the liquidity-driven component of sensitivity to global shocks to be
2used as an indicator of the presence of global funding liquidity risk. Equity returns are
then regressed on this factor. Commonality in variance is used because, unlike variance or
covariance (commonality in returns), there is no clear mechanism whereby commonality in
variance across assets in one market would inﬂuence global credit market conditions. Its
use as an exogenous indicator of liquidity risk may therefore be less problematic than the
use of commonality in returns. To further ensure the exogeneity of estimated liquidity risk
to equity prices, predicted liquidity risk is used in the second stage. The procedure can be
summed up as estimating a variable indicating excess liquidity and testing whether equity
markets incorporate a risk premium when the excess liquidity indicator is high.
This paper relates most directly to Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) contribution on
Market and Funding Liquidity, where the authors derive an asset pricing equation which
incorporates a cost of capital premium, part of which is asset speciﬁc and part of which
is common across assets. Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s model provides a theoretical jus-
tiﬁcation for the contention that common variance across assets could depend on liquidity
conditions. This paper also relates to the literature on volatility risk premia, but diﬀers in
that the volatility in question is not an asset’s own volatility, but rather common volatility
from the currency markets. Adrian and Shin (2008) note that changes in repo positions
forecast the volatility risk premium, explaining that an expansion in balance sheets due
to increased collateralized lending and borrowing releases new funding which chases yields,
“selling the tails” and sending the risk premium higher. This provides some intuitive and
empirical support for the contention that funding liquidity conditions can drive returns.
Finally, this paper also relates to the expansive literature on market liquidity premia, since
market and funding liquidity are linked. Many studies have shown an asset-speciﬁc market
liquidity premium. Ang et al (2006) have studied aggregate market liquidity, showing that
this too is priced in equities. The present paper contributes to this literature in three ways:
3it oﬀers an economic argument for the signiﬁcance of aggregate liquidity which diﬀers from
the usual market liquidity premium hypothesis, it empirically links returns back to aggregate
funding liquidity, and it estimates a timely indicator of funding liquidity conditions.
I Previous Studies of Liquidity Premia
A number of recent studies have highlighted the link between the balance sheets of ﬁnancial
intermediaries and perceived market risk appetite. Adrian et al (2009) claim that “As balance
sheets expand and leverage rises, the constraints faced by ﬁnancial intermediaries loosen,
thereby increasing their risk appetite”. This expansion or contraction in balance sheets is
found to forecast exchange rate returns, potentially providing some empirical basis for the use
of exchange rate volatility as an indicator of the liquidity risk priced in equities. Likewise,
Adrian and Shin (2008) show that changes in dealer repurchase agreements, which is the
primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries “forecast
changes in ﬁnancial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX)”. This is consistent with high funding liquidity causing
increased ﬁnancial risk, although in the present paper it is claimed that this occurs through
greater leverage providing greater exposure of equity prices to liquidity conditions, rather
than through increased risk appetite per se. The predictions from the two mechanisms
potentially oppose each other. If increased funding availability decreases the price of risk, it
will also decrease option-implied volatility (VIX), whereas if it provides greater exposure to
liquidity risk, it will increase the common component of volatility and also the cross sectional
average.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) present a model of market and funding liquidity spi-
rals. Such spirals are also discusssed by Garleanu and Pedersen (2007), where, according
4to the authors, a fall in market liquidity may lead to tighter risk management due to the
longer time required to sell a security. Tighter risk management in turn leads to lower mar-
ket liquidity, since it takes longer to ﬁnd a buyer with unused risk-bearing capacity. This
liquidity spiral leads to a fall in prices. It seems plausible that the spiral would be steeper if
investors are more highly leveraged, funding their positions partly via credit, unlike in Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009) where speculators fund their positions from existing wealth. If
investors are more highly leveraged, pressure to service debt and renew lines of credit provide
additional sources of uncertainty, further tightening risk management. Following this logic,
this paper tests whether tight ex ante credit conditions choke movement down the liquidity
spiral, while loose credit conditions enable this movement.
Studying the US equity market, Ang et al (2006) ﬁnd that stocks with high exposure
to systematic volatility risk earn low returns, and that market-wide liquidity risk does not
explain this eﬀect. The present paper claims that liquidity should have a diﬀerential eﬀect
on equity returns over diﬀerent horizons, whereby high liquidity enables a liquidity crisis,
and a reduction in liquidity is the precipitative cause. This is the rationale for examining
liquidity-induced uncertainty (volatility), which may be an indicator of potential liquidity
crises which have yet to manifest in actual liquidity.
This paper will also contribute to the literature on common risk factors in exchange
rates. Lustig and Verdelhan (2009) show how a single common factor, equal to the diﬀerence
between the return to high and low interest rate currencies, can explain a signiﬁcant portion
of the returns to the carry trade. It is possible that this factor is related to global liquidity, a
question which this paper will help to answer. Guo, Neely and Higbee (2008) have shown that
realized foreign exchange volatility is priced in equity returns, possibly because an increase
in exchange rate volatility makes the hedging of exchange rate level risk more diﬃcult. Some
portion of the foreign exchange volatility risk premium identiﬁed by these authors may be
5attributable to liquidity risk, with volatility proxying for crash risk. This paper suggests
that this is the case.
II Empirical Model
Brunnermeier and Pedersen present a model of funding and market liquidity in which φ, the









A high φ means that the level of funding available is low relative to the level needed by the
market. Normally, some part of a speculator’s position will be leveraged, and the speculator
must return to the credit market at intervals to roll over her loans. If funding liquidity is
relatively low in some period, the speculator may have to reduce her open portfolio positions.
Thus, changes in the cost of capital can inﬂuence prices by forcing speculators to reduce (or
allowing them to increase) the absolute value of their long or short positions. This is one way
in which a liquidity spiral of the type studied by Brunnermeier and Pedersen can begin. In
that paper larger margin requirements play the role of an increasing cost of capital, however
it seems likely that if larger margin requirements force a sell-oﬀ of assets this would have to
be accompanied by higher interbank lending rates, since the marginal investor would fund
part of the additional margin through the credit market and part by reducing her position
in the asset. Increasing margin requirements and increasing interbank lending rates both
aﬀect asset prices by reducing available funding.
In a model where liquidity plays a role in prices, the eﬀect on prices of a unit change in
the cost of capital will vary depending on the initial level of funding provision, which in turn
depends on interest rates. Letting h and l indicate high and low interest rate regimes, P the
6principal and i the interest rate, the change in interest repayments is greater under the low
regime:
(i








This condition is satisﬁed as long as P h <P l, in other words more is borrowed under the low
interest rate regime. Ceteris paribus, the speculator will be forced to sell a greater proportion
of her position under the low interest rate regime than under the high. If we suppose the
net order ﬂow from the speculator is a function of the change in interest repayments, which
would occur if the speculator invests until her budget constraint binds (as is the case in
Brunnermeier and Pedersen for speculators who take a non-zero position in some asset) then
we expect order ﬂow and asset prices to depend more on interest rate changes under a low
interest rate regime. In this way, the interest rate level determines the extent to which
funding liquidity drives asset price uncertainty. To establish this relationship empirically
requires an estimate of liquidity-driven volatility, where volatility is used as an indicator of
uncertainty.
Following from Equation 1, an asset’s volatility can be decomposed into a fundamental-










j + ¯ bjVa r(φ) (4)
provides an estimate of the liquidity driven volatility factor which is unbiased under the
assumption that idiosyncratic volatility is mean zero with zero covariance in the cross section,
7in which case the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is zero for a suﬃciently large sample size
of assets, k. In the empirical analysis, volatility z-scores (whose construction is explained
below) are used. These have zero mean but possibly non-zero cross-sectional correlation.
The correlation, and thus the term 1/kΣjajVa r j, may be non-zero if there is some factor
other than liquidity conditions that determines the degree of common variation in exchange
rates. Zero correlation of non-liquidity related volatility is not required, since estimated
common volatility is used in the second stage. As long as non-liquidity related volatility is
orthogonal to interest rates, this estimated volatility is an unbiased estimate of liquidity-
induced volatility. This orthogonality is guaranteed by deﬁnition of the common volatility
as the component of volatility that derives from the interest rate level.
As discussed above, the interest rate level (it) may determine the component of average
asset price uncertainty that derives from uncertainty in liquidity (¯ b
j
tVa r(φt)). By deﬁnition
of the common volatility component as the component of volatility deriving from liquidity
risk, average fundamental volatility (1/kΣjajVa r j) is orthogonal to interest rates. Regressing
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tVa r(φt). To further strengthen the claim for the exogeneity of common exchange rate
volatility to equity returns, predicted common volatility is used in the equity regressions
instead of realized volatility. Predicted common volatility is interpreted as an indicator of
crash risk arising from the level of liquidity and leverage. The ﬁnal step in the procedure is
to regress equity returns on predicted common volatility, to test whether liquidity risk is a
priced risk factor. The twelve month lagged moving average of the three-month T-Bill rate
8is used to represent the interest rate level. This time horizon is consistent with the argument
that excess liquidity could build up over a sustained period of excessively low rates.
III Model Estimation and Data
A Model Estimation
The model is estimated in two stages.
Stage 1: Estimate the uncertainty due to liquidity conditions in exchange rate markets
by regressing average exchange rate volatility on the lagged (by one month) twelve-month
moving average of the three-month T-Bill return:
Va r(p
j
t)=α + βit−1 +  t. (6)
To allow a causal interpretation of the eﬀect of the interest rate level on liquidity volatility,
this regression is implemented within a Structural VAR, identiﬁed by the restriction that
time-t exchange rate volatility cannot aﬀect the lagged twelve month moving average of the
T-Bill return.
Stage 2: Determine if liquidity volatility is priced in equity markets by regressing equity
returns on predicted common exchange rate volatility
rt = γ + δ  Va r(p
j
t)+ζFt + ut, (7)
where F is a vector of other factors commonly used to explain equity returns. The factors
used are the market return, the size and value factors of Fama and French (1993), the mo-
mentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), changes in the VIX volatility index, Pastor
9and Stambaugh’s (2001) market liquidity factor, the TED spread and realized exchange rate
volatility.
A.1 Calculation of Global Currency Volatility
Country i’s volatility in month t is ωi
t =( σi
t − ¯ σi
t)/σσi
t where σi
t is the standard deviation in
month t of the daily exchange rate and σσi
t is the standard deviation over all periods of the
monthly standard deviations. This gives a scale-free measure of exchange rate volatility for
a given month. For example, ωi
t = 0 if month t’s volatility is equal to the long run average,
and ωi
t = 1 if it exceeds by one standard deviation the long run average. Global volatility
is then calculated as ωt =Σ ibiωi
t, where bi is country (or block of countries in the case of
the euro) i’s static weight, calculated as its share of total GDP of the six areas in 2000.
The weights are given in Table I. The global currency volatility measure is based on the
six major ﬂoating currencies against the dollar: yen, euro, pound, Swiss franc, Australian
and Canadian dollars. Prior to the introduction of the euro, the Deutschmark is used in its
place, with the weights adjusted accordingly.
B Data
Size, value and momentum factors, as well as the market return and the 25 size by value
portfolios are all taken from Kenneth French’s data library.2 For countries other than the US,
market return, book to market equity and earnings/price data are also taken from Kenneth
French’s data library. International returns are based on dollar prices. The countries for
which these data are provided are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
2http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
10Exchange rate data, VIX (the Chicago Board Options Exchange implied volatility index),
T-Bill returns and the TED spread are taken from Global Financial Data. The TED spread
is the diﬀerence between 3-month LIBOR (an average of interest rates oﬀered in the London
interbank market for 3-month dollar-denominated loans) and the 3-month treasury bill rate.
A rising TED spread may be an indication that liquidity is being withdrawn. LIBOR data
are available from 1986, and this year is chosen as a starting point for the analysis.
GDP data for the purpose of weighting currencies in the average volatility calculation
are taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009).
IV Empirical Results
The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis advanced above, that low interest
rates can increase equity risk by increasing investors’ degree of leverage. Table I shows that
the major exchange rates display a strong common volatility factor. Regressions of individ-
ual exchange rate volatilities on the estimated common factor have signiﬁcant explanatory
power in every case. Figure 1 shows the considerable variation in interest rates over the
period 1986-2008, and also suggests that the choice of interest rate will not be a critical fac-
tor at monthly frequency. Figure 2 plots realized common exchange rate volatility against
the three-month T-Bill rate. It is possible that contemporaneous exchange rate volatility is
endogenous to the T-Bill rate, with both variables potentially responding to ﬁnancial market
distress, for example. This is consistent with the signiﬁcant negative correlation shown in
Table A. Of greater interest in this paper is any possible long run eﬀect of the interest
rate level on common exchange rate volatility, which is interpreted as an estimate of the
common asset price volatility arising from risks to funding liquidity. In order to analyze
this possible relationship, a structural vector auto-regression is estimated. It is interesting
11to note that both realized and predicted common exchange rate volatility are signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with the TED spread, which is sometimes used as an indicator of illiq-
uidity. Rather than indicating actual illiquidity, the average volatility variable is intended to
estimate uncertainty in funding liquidity, so that a perfect correlation with actual illiquidity
would not be expected. Similarly, the correlation with Pastor and Stambaugh’s liquidity fac-
tor (not shown) is signiﬁcant and negative for both realized and estimated liquidity volatility,
although the p-value in the case of estimated volatility is higher at 0.06.
The SVAR regressions show a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect from shocks in the lagged twelve-
month moving average interest rate to common exchange rate volatility. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that holding interest rates low for too long can increase the risk of a
funding liquidity crash, via increasing leverage, and vice versa: high interest rates reduce
leverage, reduce the crash risk arising from possible changes in funding liquidity, and reduce
common asset price volatility. Figure 3 shows that a shock to the moving average of the
interest rate has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on exchange rate volatility after about a year. The
forecast error variance decomposition is show in Figure 4. The component of the exchange
rate volatility forecast error attributable to shocks in the moving average t-bill rate is not
signiﬁcant at standard signiﬁcance levels. This may be a consequence of high persistence
rendering the moving average representation on which the error decomposition is based
less accurate. Explicitly detrending the series using Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock’s (1996)
generalized least squares Dickey Fuller procedure, instead of relying on the lag structure used
in the SVAR, produces immediately signiﬁcant forecast error component (shown in the right
panel of Figure 4). The SVAR lag structure is preferred since it is more readily interpretable
and because forecasting is not the primary aim of this research.
Table III shows that the exchange rate volatility prediction based on the estimated SVAR
explains part of the cross sectional return dispersion of twenty-ﬁve size-by-value Fama French
12portfolios (Fama and French, 1993). This suggests that a prolonged period of excessively
low interest rates increases liquidity crash risk, and that investors demand higher returns
to compensate for such risk. Equally, a sustained period of high interest rates eventually
reduces leverage and funding-related crash risk, leading to lower equity returns.
The recessions of the early 1990’s and late 2000’s coincided with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
market turmoil. To test if this fact inﬂuences the results, the model is re-estimated over the
sub-period 1993-2006 (inclusive). The relationship between common exchange rate volatility
and interest rate levels is still clearly seen over this period, although it is notable that the
delay between an interest rate shock and the resulting common volatility is somewhat longer
(Figure 5). This may be inﬂuenced by the response to the recession of the early 2000’s. The
results appear to suggest that the initial drop in interest rates in response to this recession
did not adversely aﬀect liquidity risk, but the sustained low interest rates over several years
eventually had an aﬀect. The second stage results also remain signiﬁcant, although the level
of signiﬁcance falls. The p-value for the test of joint signiﬁcance of the predicted exchange
rate volatility betas over the 1993-2006 period rises to 0.06 (Table IV).
An alternative line of robustness checks investigates other measures of volatility. The
ﬁrst is range-based volatility, where the daily range of an exchange rate is calculated as the
absolute diﬀerence between the daily high and low values. Standardized monthly averages of
this value are then calculated, in line with the calculations detailed in Section III. The second
alternative measure controls for shifts in the exchange rate by subtracting the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between the open and close prices from the range. This variable is examined
in ﬁrst diﬀerences, due to high persistence in the levels. Structural VAR’s based on both
of these variables satisfy the stability conditions, despite the high persistence (Figure 6).
Estimated betas based on the range measure are presented in Table V. These betas are
jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
13Finally, Table VI shows the estimated market betas for a number of countries, controlling
for the international Fama French factors. Predicted volatility betas are not signiﬁcant in
the four portfolio cross section formed on the book-to-market equity and earnings/price ratio
available from Kenneth French’s website, but they are signiﬁcant for a number of countries
when tested on the market returns. Many of the countries for which the volatility beta
is signiﬁcant are countries which often witness funding liquidity-related changes in capital
ﬂows, most notably Japan, due to its involvement in the carry trade.
V Conclusion
Responding to the late 2000’s ﬁnancial crisis, many commentators have suggested that ex-
cessively low interest rates may have contributed to the build-up of leverage in the ﬁnancial
system, and that such high levels of leverage increased crash risk. If such liquidity crash
risk is undiversiﬁable, then investors may have demanded a risk premium for exposure to
it. This paper tests whether this occurred. A decomposition of asset return variance into
the liquidity (common) and the idiosyncratic component produces an estimate of liquidity
volatility. Since this source of volatility is common across assets and asset classes, it is
possible to estimate funding liquidity volatility on one asset class and test its signiﬁcance
on another. Exchange rates are chosen as the asset class on which volatility is estimated,
with the second stage testing performed on equities. The results support a long run (one
year and above) causation from the interest rate level to funding liquidity uncertainty. This
uncertainty is found to be priced in equity markets.
This paper provides a measure which may be useful as one indicator of whether asset
prices are supported by excess leverage. When estimated liquidity volatility is high, monetary
policy or ﬁnancial oversight authorities should consider taking steps to reduce the overheating
14in credit markets, and thus reduce the risk of a liquidity crash. The common component of
exchange rate volatility is a noisy indicator of liquidity volatility. It is possible that less noisy
measures could be developed using the methodology outlined here, perhaps by utilizing an
array of asset classes instead of exchange rates alone to estimate liquidity risk.
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17A Data
COUNTRY GDP WEIGHT R-Squared
Pre-Euro Post-Euro
Euro - 0.54 87
Japan 0.38 0.23 44
Germany 0.26 - 67
United Kingdom 0.18 0.11 45
Canada 0.1 0.06 24
Australia 0.06 0.04 29
Switzerland 0.03 0.02 60
Table I: The table shows weights for the exchange rates used to calculate global exchange rate
volatility, and the R-squared from a regression of estimated global exchange rate volatility
on the volatility of a given country or area (monthly regressions using the average daily
volatility for a given month, based on the bilateral dollar exchange rate). All R-squared
values are signiﬁcant, including for those rates with a small weight in the calculation. This























Interest Rates and Market Returns
Figure 1: “Disc Rate” refers to the target discount rate for the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York City (the Federal Funds Rate). LIBOR refers to the United States three-month LIBOR
rate. The T-Bill rate is, likewise, for three month T-Bills. The three interest rates are seen
to comove closely at monthly frequency. Falling interest rates tend to coincide with notable
negative excess returns to the S&P 500, consistent with interest rates falling in response
to weak economic conditions. This suggests there may be a negative contemporaneous
correlation between interest rates and market turmoil. Lagged, longer term eﬀects are tested

























1985m1 1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
Month
ER Volatility T−Bill Rate
ER Volatility and the T−Bill Rate
Figure 2: Average exchange rate volatility and the U.S. T-Bill return. The volatility unit is
the (rescaled) weighted cross-sectional average z-score, as described in Section B. The spike
in late 1992 is caused by the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis, which saw high volatility in
many major exchange rates. Exchange rate volatility clearly displays high variance and a
large number of positive spikes.
20ER Vol  ERVol TED HML SMB ΔVIX MOM TB MA TBt Market
ER Vol 1
 ERVol 0.44* 1
TED 0.32* 0.27* 1
HML -0.04 -0.08 0 1
SMB 0.02 0.06 -0.1* -0.3* 1
ΔVIX 0.20* -0.03 0.46* 0.1 -0.2* 1
MOM 0.04 0 0.04 -0.11 0.09 0.1 1
TB MA -0.09 -0.2* -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 0 0.04 1
TBt -0.1* -0.3* -0.02 -0.04 -0.1* 0 0.03 0.90* 1
Market -0.1* 0.02 -0.2* -0.4* 0.20* -0.6* -0.11 0.04 0.07 1
Table II: Correlation coeﬃcients for explanatory variables. A star indicates signiﬁcance at
the 5% level. “TB MA” refers to the twelve month lagged moving average of the T-Bill
rate. Exchange rate volatility is negatively correlated with both the T-Bill and market
excess return, although the T-Bill and market excess return are not themselves correlated.
This may be consistent with the use of volatility as an indicator of liquidity related risk, if
such risk is priced. Predicted exchange rate volatility is not unconditionally correlated with
the market return, in contrast to the traditional risk factors. The positive and signiﬁcant
correlation of TED and both predicted and realized exchange rate volatility may support
the interpretation of this variable as signifying liquidity risk.
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Figure 3: Structural Impulse Response Function, 1986-2008, monthly frequency. The iden-
tifying restriction is that the time-t exchange rate volatility cannot inﬂuence the lagged
twelve-month moving average of the T-Bill rate. A shock to the lagged moving average of
the interest rate has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on exchange rate volatility after approx-
imately a year, which persists for several months. The predicted exchange rate volatility
based on this relation is used in the second stage, below. The highest order lag included
in the SVAR is 16. The lag selection process used started with 24 lags and individually
eliminated insigniﬁcant lags according to the Wald Lag exclusion criteria. The conﬁdence
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Figure 4: The graphs show the structural forecast error variance decomposition for the SVAR
of the interest rate and exchange rate volatility, with 90% conﬁdence intervals. The impulse
variable is the lagged twelve-month moving average of the T-Bill rate and the response
variable is the average exchange rate volatility. The high variance of the estimated variance
decomposition may be due to persistence in the variables rendering the moving average
representation on which the decomposition is based less accurate. The right hand graph
shows the decomposition when both variables are subjected to explicit detrending (using a
Generalized Least Squares Dickey Fuller procedure) before estimating the SVAR.
23B Equity Pricing
Value
Low 2 3 4 High
Small -4.32 -4.08* -2.74* -3.59** -3.79**
2 1.43 -0.95 2.1 -1.32 1.11
3 0.24 1.39 1.4 0.74 6.95***
4 -1.44 0.14 0.47 -1.79 -0.85
Big -2.47** 0.6 -1.55 -3.46** 4.30*
Table III: Predicted ER Vol Betas for 25 Fama French Factors, 1986-2008. Market returns,
the HML, SMB factors and momentum factors, changes in VIX and realized exchange rate
volatility are all controlled for. The signiﬁcance levels of the predicted exchange rate volatility
factor are not as great as those of the traditional factors, however they are jointly signiﬁcant
according to a Seemingly Unrelated Regression χ2 test (Zellner, 1962). When conditioned
on these other factors, it is diﬃcult to discern a pattern in the betas, although there may be
a pattern of increasing coeﬃcients towards Large and High Value companies. The betas for
a four factor model (including Market Return, HML and SMB) are almost identical to those
shown here. Inclusion of two estimates of actual (il)liquidity, the TED spread and Pastor
and Stambaugh’s (2001) aggregate market liquidity factor, does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
results. This is consistent with the interpretation of predicted volatility as reﬂecting actual,
unobserved liquidity volatility.
24C Robustness
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Figure 5: The response of exchange rate volatility is slower in this subsample, but remains
negative and signiﬁcant. The delay may be due to the rate drop around 2001 being initially
justiﬁed, in the sense that it did not cause excess liquidity, but the continued regime of low
interest rates eventually increased liquidity volatility.
25A.2 Equity Pricing
Value
Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.46 -5.77 -3.13 -6.52** -2.72
2 2.3 -0.65 0.36 -5.74** -2.17
3 2.98 0.92 -2.22 -0.44 0.18
4 -0.94 -4.84 -1.63 -1.78 -1.5
Big -4.22** -1.44 -3.12 -4.81 5.05
Table IV: Predicted ER Vol Betas for 25 Fama French Factors, 1993-2006. Betas retain joint
signiﬁcance with a p-value of .06. Market returns, the size and value factors are included as
control variables.
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Impulse Response Functions for Alternative Volatility Estimates
Figure 6: The left panel shows the structural IRF for range based volatility, estimated over
1986-2008. Range refers to the absolute diﬀerence between the daily high and low exchange
rates. The right panel shows the eﬀect of a shock to the lagged moving average T-Bill rate
on ﬁrst-diﬀerenced average intradaily volatility, controlling for level changes in the exchange
rate. To control for level changes, the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the daily close
and open rates is subtracted from the range. Persistence in both cases is clearly considerable,
however the eigenvalue stability conditions are satisﬁed.
27B.2 Equity Pricing
Value
Low 2 3 4 High
Small -1.6 -1.29 -1.86 -0.55 -2.64*
2 1.87 0.64 1.55 0.09 2
3 -0.29 1 3.54** 1.2 7.40***
4 -0.03 0.45 0.76 -1.07 -2.45
Big -1.54 1.69 -0.39 -1.14 5.38**
Table V: Range Based Volatility Betas. These betas are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
28D International Results
COUNTRY  ERVOL BEME EP
Australia 0.09 -0.17 -0.29***
Austria 0.05 0.04 -0.07
Belgium 0 0.09 0.13
Canada 0.09 -0.04 -0.29***
Switzerland 0.06 0.28*** -0.14*
Germany 0 -0.01 -0.29***
Denmark -0.05 -0.05 -0.11
Spain 0.08 -0.21** -0.17*
Finland 0.19* -0.43*** -0.09
France 0.05 -0.01 0.1
United Kingdom 0.08 0.21** 0.06
Hong Kong 0.17* 0.63*** -0.15
Ireland 0.01 -0.06 0
Italy 0.07 0.28*** -0.19**
Japan 0.17** 0.31*** -0.76***
Malaysia 0.46* 0.61*** -0.17
Netherlands 0 0.12** 0.15**
Norway 0.1 0.12** 0.03
New Zealand 0.13 -0.04 0.23***
Singapore 0.21** 0.36*** -0.29***
Sweden 0.17* 0.07 -0.30***
Table VI: Factor betas for market returns for various countries, 1986-2008 (data taken
from Kenneth French’s website). The (scaled) predicted exchange rate volatility variable
(  ERVOL) is not signiﬁcant in the cross section based on four portfolios formed on book-to-
market equity and the earnings/price ratio, however it is signiﬁcant for some countries when
tested on the market return. The countries which show a signiﬁcant beta may correspond
with those countries which are often implicated on either side of the carry trade, such as
Japan, Malaysia and Hong Kong. The volatility of carry trade ﬂows may enable the global
funding liquidity risk factor to be detected in these countries’ equity markets.
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